Home » Archives » KoreanStudies » Re: literature types on NK perspectives
| Re: literature types on NK perspectives [message #6795] |
Thu, 07 August 2003 15:27  |
Balazs Szalontai
Messages: 54
Registered: September 2002
|
Member |
|
|
Some comments on the issue of North Korean resilience:
1) The fact that the economic embargo in general and the famine in
particular did not bring the regime down is not as surprising as one
may think. Neither Stalin's USSR nor the PRC collapsed as a result of
the famines of 1932-33 and 1959-60 respectively. By contrast, a
much less serious economic crisis was well enough to undermine and
bring down a series of regimes from Berlin to Ulaan Baatar in 1989-
91. A really hard-line dictatorship, and the NK regime certainly belongs
to this category, can overcome enormous difficulties which would
topple a softer one. See also Iraq in 1991-2003. (I hope no one in
Washington will conclude on the basis of this last comparison that
the only way of solving the "NK problem" is to invade the country and
occupy every square inch of it...) The East European events of
1953-56 demonstrated that intense anti-regime protests usually took
place only in those countries where the regimes showed clear signs
of weakness and publicly practised self-criticism for their previous
policies, thus encouraging the population.
2) By the 1960s, the DPRK had become very much independent from
both the Soviets and the Chinese (a process that had begun at least
a decade earlier), which made the regime much more stable than the
Soviet "satellites" in Eastern Europe. From 1958 on, the Soviets could
not interfere in North Korean intra-party affairs, and from 1965 on
they found it advisable not to make any comments on NK domestic
policies.
3) There was a clear geographical pattern in the collapse of Communist
regimes in 1989-91. In Eastern Europe, even fiercely independent
Albania and Yugoslavia was brought down by the shock of the Soviet
and East European earthquake, since these countries geographically
and culturally belong to the same region. No one could really believe
that socialism could survive in Albania after it had collapsed in the
whole of Eastern Europe: the APL leaders themselves also became
demoralized. By contrast, in East and Southeast Asia it was only
Mongolia and Kampuchea, that is, two regimes strongly dominated by
some powerful neighbor and lacking a substantial domestic legitimacy,
that experienced such developments. Vietnam, Laos, and North Korea
is still there. For these countries, China is more important, either in a
geographical or a cultural sense, than Russia, and the PRC is not likely
to collapse soon. The mere existence of a (more or less friendly)
Communist party-state in China gives a strong psychological support
to the NK leaders, though they do not really want to imitate Chinese
reformist policies. Significantly, the Castro regime, another nationalist
dictatorship that does not belong to the East European geographical
and cultural region, is also still in power.
4) Succession crises often proved dangerous for dictatorships, facilitating
either a reformist course (as it happened in the USSR and China after
the death of Stalin and Mao) or a collapse of the regime. By contrast,
Kim Il-sung began to deal with that problem as early as the 1960s, and
by the time he died, Kim Chong-il had been more or less firmly entrenched.
On the other hand, Kim Chong-il may not be similarly successful. By the
1990s, a high number of Kim relatives (incomparably more than in the
1960s and 1970s) had been placed into political positions, and it is well-
known from the history of the Yi dynasty that such a situation often
provokes conflicts between the potential successors as soon as the king
is likely to die soon. Such a family squabble may destabilize the NK regime
in the same way as it happened several times in old Choson.
5) Concentrated American pressure will, in all probability, harden, rather
than undermine, the resilience of the NK leaders and cadres in the
same way as it happened in North Vietnam and Iran in 1964-73 and
in the 1980s respectively. Such a war psychosis makes any concession
look extremely dangerous. In 1989, most East European leaders and
cadres could feel that if they stepped down peacefully, they would not
be lynched on the street or sent to the Guantanamo basis for
interrogation. (In fact, many of them became as capitalist as one
can get.) By contrast, the men in P'yongyang intensely distrust
both the United States (South Korea, Japan, etc.) and the population
they rule, and they are very much afraid of the consequences of a
regime collapse. After the labor camps, the downed South Korean
airliner and other incidents, this is somewhat understandable... In
any case, US saber-rattling is probably as counter-productive in the
NK case as in Cuba. Many Cubans joke that if the U.S. embargo
ceased, Fidel would fall the next day.
Balazs Szalontai
Central European University
History Department
e-mail: hphszb01@phd.ceu.hu (temporary)
aoverl53@yahoo.co.uk
Even literature types like me get asked about what's going on in Korea; and
especially, what's up with the North; etc.
In desperation, I ask those who want to know, what do you think is going
on? And my interlocutors wonder, why hasn't the regime collapsed? W and
his crowd seem to assume that it will, they add.
Well, there you have it! What more needs to be said, either way? The W
House either knows or doesn't. Who are we to be perplexed by difficult
amiguities?
It could be added that people have been assuming the very same thing for
fifty years, ever since economic and political embargos were put in place
against North Korea at the end of the Korean War. That's what such
embargos are designed to do; starve a regime into collapse. Or maybe as a
literature type I don't understand what an embargo is really meant to
accomplish.
Observers held their collective breath when Kim Il Sung died. Gotta happen
now, they seemed to be thinking. If Poindexter's little parlor had been
operating then, what a spike in the betting we would have seen!
Predictably.
And just a short while ago, during a 'state' visit to Seoul, one of the
White House terriers was barking about the North Korean regime .
So? If the Washington types think the collapse is going to happen,
prompted perhaps by the yapping of some minor official, and the think tank
types do too, why not? Here's where the literature type wanders off into
reflections on, of all things, history.
The later kings of Choson: we have forgotten their example. Regime
collapse was constantly just around the corner, what with military
ineptitude, fiscal chaos, and the debilitating factional wars. But with a
deep and wide bureaucratic state apparatus, and an officialdom trained and
indoctrinated to see state service as the highest good, there were none of
the internal structural contradictions that would lead to a collapse of the
regime.
It all ended remarkably quietly when Japan started pushing from outside, in
the last decade of the nineteenth century. We recall, though, that the US
failed to make good on promises to come to Korea's aid when Japan began to
pursue its colonial ambitions on the peninsula in earnest.
Ah well, now I am in a muddle. But I wonder if there are historical
examples, with a longer more complex narrative that might help to explain
either the puzzling resilience of the North Korean state, or the failure of
outside observers and policy-makers to frame their questions and plans in a
meaningful or productive way.
Regime collapse? That's what some dictionaries would define as
apocalyptic; an apocalyptic vision imposed from the outside. It seems to
be, If the North Korean state collapses, then the US will lift its
embargos, and health will return to the body of the population. One
contradictory aspect of the idea is that it provides a very handy cause to
blame for all the internal difficulties in the DPRK-- namely, the United
States. It is contradictory because it helps to support the very regime,
in terms of North Korean public opinion, that it is intended to hamper and
weaken.
What sort of response follows from the North? Apocalyptic, but in terms of
nuclear weapons.
Are the W House pronouncements, locally or abroad, just rhetoric? Might
there be efforts underway to avoid Armageddon? One hopes so, encouraged at
the moment by North Korean willingness to dismiss the barking dog and get
back to discussions of multilateral talks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Re: Re: literature types on NK perspectives [message #6805 is a reply to message #6795] |
Sat, 09 August 2003 14:46  |
Morgan E. Clippinger
Messages: 2
Registered: February 2003
|
Junior Member |
|
|
Dear Group:
Balazs Szalontai has hit the nail on the head in his discussion of North
Korean resiliency or staying power. It makes many of the same points that I
and my CIA colleagues made for nearly a decade. Inasmuch as I retired from
the Agency five years ago, I would not presume to speculate on what Agency
thinking is today, but I personally do not believe that North Korea is
"teetering on the edge of economic collapse" or that economic sanctions
would be effective or that the military option is a viable one.
I recognize that many people have very strong opinions about the North
Korean issue (and the Iraq issue), but I think more will be gained if the
dialogue is kept as much as possible on a calm and unemotional plane. It is
sad to see intellectual discussion in this forum using expressions such as
"barking dogs," "CIA hacks and their idiot analysts," "fools," "too
stupid," "White House terriers barking," etc. But then, being from the old
school, I guess I'm not accustomed to the language of today's scholarship.
Alas, times change.
Inasmuch as CIA has been tagged as one of the culprits, as a graduate of
that much maligned institution I feel constrained to put in a few words of
clarification, particularly as it regards Korea, to dispel some of the
misconceptions about CIA.
First, it is important to realize that CIA does not make policy. That is
the function of the President, the NSC and the State and Defense
departments. The mission of the CIA Intelligence Directorate (the
analytical arm) is to produce unbiased, well reasoned analysis to help the
policymaker in making his own policy decisions. Therefore, if one has
problems with US foreign policy, he should talk to the policymakers and
their minions.
Of course, every profession has its hacks, but who are these "CIA hacks"
that Jay Lewis mentions and why are CIA analysts in particular singled out
for verbal flogging? I have not seen any CIA analysis on North Korea in
the media that would lead one to make that comment, but I assume that there
must have been something out there to occasion that remark. (Actually, the
general public rarely gets to see CIA analyses, which are declassified only
long after they have lost their relevance. Hence my confusion as to the
reference to "idiot analysts." Seriously, I would appreciate knowing about
such analysis just to bring myself up to speed.)
By the way, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which has been bruited
about of late, should not be confused with CIA analysis. It is product of
the intelligence community or IC, which includes inter alia CIA, NSA
(National Security Agency), DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), INR (the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research), the military
services, and several other agencies. Often a CIA analyst is the principal
drafter of an NIE, but that draft is then subjected to intense IC scrutiny,
sentence by sentence, word by word, ad nauseum with a dozen or more agencies
all having a chance to agree or disagree with judgments or to offer
different wording. During my years with the Agency I was the principal
drafter of a number of NIEs on Korea. Some were accepted with few changes;
others were edited beyond recognition. It's "consensus analysis," but
that's the way the game is played.
A few personal observations about CIA analysts in general. Most senior
analysts have graduate degrees, some are fluent in several foreign
languages, and many have lived and studied in their countries of
specialization. They usually have in-depth knowledge of their own
geographic areas and solid grounding in an academic discipline. Some teach
university courses in their spare time and others publish scholarly research
papers.
Like other CIA analysts, the Korea analysts have access to information not
available to academic or think-tank researchers and they follow Korean
issues on a full-time basis. They know Korean history and, most assuredly,
know about the Korean war. These analysts also participate in round-tables
and seminars with specialists in the academic community; they make it a
point to keep up with research and opinions of Western, Korean and Japanese
scholars; and they travel to Korea and many other countries to exchange
views with academic and government specialists. In short, they are as
passionate about their subject as any Korean-history professor is about his.
In my view, the analytical rigor of CIA analysts in general is on a par with
that of academic researchers. If anything, the CIA analysts are more
objective than many of their academic counterparts, who have the luxury of
expressing their own personal views in their work. A system of peer review
and multi-layered editing also helps to keep personal opinion out of Agency
judgments. CIA analysts are of all stripes. Some are liberals, some are
conservatives, and some are in the middle. Within the intelligence
community there are many shades of nuance, especially when it comes to North
Korea. That said, the common trait of the intelligence analysts is, I
believe, their intellectual honesty.
At the end of the day, no matter how well reasoned and sound the analytical
logic and judgments might be, the policymaker may well choose to ignore them
completely. In my experience, many-if not most-senior policymakers never
even read CIA analyses. Policymakers are usually too busy. It is more
likely that their gatekeepers summarize or gist the findings and
conclusions. Most importantly, CIA analysis-or any analysis, for that
matter-rarely changes a policymaker's mind. It pains me to say this, but
the policymaker usually has already made up his mind and does not want to be
confused with facts. Naturally, if the analysis happens to support his own
theories and policies, then he will latch on to it to bolster his arguments.
That, in a nutshell, is what it's all about.
Regards,
Morgan E. Clippinger
>From: Jay Lewis
Dear Group:
Balazs Szalontai has hit the nail on the head in his discussion of North
Korean resiliency or staying power. It makes many of the same points that I
and my CIA colleagues made for nearly a decade. Inasmuch as I retired from
the Agency five years ago, I would not presume to speculate on what Agency
thinking is today, but I personally do not believe that North Korea is
"teetering on the edge of economic collapse" or that economic sanctions
would be effective or that the military option is a viable one.
I recognize that many people have very strong opinions about the North
Korean issue (and the Iraq issue), but I think more will be gained if the
dialogue is kept as much as possible on a calm and unemotional plane. It is
sad to see intellectual discussion in this forum using expressions such as
"barking dogs," "CIA hacks and their idiot analysts," "fools," "too
stupid," "White House terriers barking," etc. But then, being from the old
school, I guess I'm not accustomed to the language of today's scholarship.
Alas, times change.
Inasmuch as CIA has been tagged as one of the culprits, as a graduate of
that much maligned institution I feel constrained to put in a few words of
clarification, particularly as it regards Korea, to dispel some of the
misconceptions about CIA.
First, it is important to realize that CIA does not make policy. That is
the function of the President, the NSC and the State and Defense
departments. The mission of the CIA Intelligence Directorate (the
analytical arm) is to produce unbiased, well reasoned analysis to help the
policymaker in making his own policy decisions. Therefore, if one has
problems with US foreign policy, he should talk to the policymakers and
their minions.
Of course, every profession has its hacks, but who are these "CIA hacks"
that Jay Lewis mentions and why are CIA analysts in particular singled out
for verbal flogging? I have not seen any CIA analysis on North Korea in
the media that would lead one to make that comment, but I assume that there
must have been something out there to occasion that remark. (Actually, the
general public rarely gets to see CIA analyses, which are declassified only
long after they have lost their relevance. Hence my confusion as to the
reference to "idiot analysts." Seriously, I would appreciate knowing about
such analysis just to bring myself up to speed.)
By the way, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which has been bruited
about of late, should not be confused with CIA analysis. It is product of
the intelligence community or IC, which includes inter alia CIA, NSA
(National Security Agency), DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), INR (the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research), the military
services, and several other agencies. Often a CIA analyst is the principal
drafter of an NIE, but that draft is then subjected to intense IC scrutiny,
sentence by sentence, word by word, ad nauseum with a dozen or more agencies
all having a chance to agree or disagree with judgments or to offer
different wording. During my years with the Agency I was the principal
drafter of a number of NIEs on Korea. Some were accepted with few changes;
others were edited beyond recognition. It's "consensus analysis," but
that's the way the game is played.
A few personal observations about CIA analysts in general. Most senior
analysts have graduate degrees, some are fluent in several foreign
languages, and many have lived and studied in their countries of
specialization. They usually have in-depth knowledge of their own
geographic areas and solid grounding in an academic discipline. Some teach
university courses in their spare time and others publish scholarly research
papers.
Like other CIA analysts, the Korea analysts have access to information not
available to academic or think-tank researchers and they follow Korean
issues on a full-time basis. They know Korean history and, most assuredly,
know about the Korean war. These analysts also participate in round-tables
and seminars with specialists in the academic community; they make it a
point to keep up with research and opinions of Western, Korean and Japanese
scholars; and they travel to Korea and many other countries to exchange
views with academic and government specialists. In short, they are as
passionate about their subject as any Korean-history professor is about his.
In my view, the analytical rigor of CIA analysts in general is on a par with
that of academic researchers. If anything, the CIA analysts are more
objective than many of their academic counterparts, who have the luxury of
expressing their own personal views in their work. A system of peer review
and multi-layered editing also helps to keep personal opinion out of Agency
judgments. CIA analysts are of all stripes. Some are liberals, some are
conservatives, and some are in the middle. Within the intelligence
community there are many shades of nuance, especially when it comes to North
Korea. That said, the common trait of the intelligence analysts is, I
believe, their intellectual honesty.
At the end of the day, no matter how well reasoned and sound the analytical
logic and judgments might be, the policymaker may well choose to ignore them
completely. In my experience, many-if not most-senior policymakers never
even read CIA analyses. Policymakers are usually too busy. It is more
likely that their gatekeepers summarize or gist the findings and
conclusions. Most importantly, CIA analysis-or any analysis, for that
matter-rarely changes a policymaker's mind. It pains me to say this, but
the policymaker usually has already made up his mind and does not want to be
confused with facts. Naturally, if the analysis happens to support his own
theories and policies, then he will latch on to it to bolster his arguments.
That, in a nutshell, is what it's all about.
Regards,
Morgan E. Clippinger
---------------------------------------
>From: Jay Lewis
>Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List
>To: Korean Studies Discussion List
>Subject: Re: [KS] even literature types
>Date: Fri, 08 Aug 2003 02:54:30 +0100
>
>David, the `literary type', is willing to speak out; why not the
>rest of us? Where the hell have we been? Lest we forget, the
>success of evil is only dependent on the willingness of good men to
>say nothing. We're pathetic, aren't we?
>
>Particularly the historians. Where are we? After all, historians
>study the past in order to predict the future, right? And there are
>a lot of us, right? Or, do I have some wires crossed about our
>disciplines and why we do what we do? Is it for tenure or for the
>maintenance of civilization?
>The barking dogs (Wolfowitz, Rove, etc.) are a dime-a-dozen, but the
>trend is where? Where are we going? Certainly, the `collapse soon'
>crowd are too stupid, since they seem to know nothing of Korean
>history; not even of the Korean War. You know, the Korean people,
>north and south, are tenacious. Forgot that one, didn't you George?
> But maybe not. Germany collapsed in a fortnight. Would the DPRK?
> Maybe the Mercedes Benzs and the fabulous parties will bring down
>the DPRK. But, what do we say? Do we leave this discussion to the
>CIA hacks and their idiot analysts? The same fools who brought us
>Afghanistan and Iraq, and who are lining up to target Syria or Iran?
> There option is bombing. What do we do? Where is the intellectual
>debate? Are we spineless? I'm nearly sick to my stomach at the
>silence...............................
>
>Jay Lewis
>____________________________________
>
>
|
|
|
|
| Re: Re: literature types on NK perspectives [message #6806 is a reply to message #6795] |
Sun, 10 August 2003 09:34 |
dmccann
Messages: 90
Registered: December 1998
|
Member |
|
|
My thanks to Morgan Clippinger for an edifying post. Points taken.
Further analysis-- or not exactly analysis, the point is so obivous, if
curious; call it an elemental sorting: on the one hand, academic types,
CIA analysts, and others who may be said to know something about a place
and its history, and on the other, the overly busy or otherwise preoccupied
policymakers who don't read any of the analyses.
Where does this go?
It might be possible that the policy making is informed in some other way.
It might be possible that behind or beneath the obvious provocation of the
speech in Seoul, there might be some other line or objective of
communication between the US and the DPRK which encouraged the DPRK to
ignore or dismiss the -- What should one say if not 'yapping'? Maybe
'highly insulting remarks'?-- by the White House spokesperson, and keep
pursuing multilateral talks. (-- efforts underway to avoid Armageddon--)
Assuming there is little if any transfer of information from the area
specialist realm to the policy making realm, one might reasonably suggest
that it doesn't matter much, in a literal or figurative sense, if some
expert on Korea makes an error, or reaches a faulty conclusion. That isn't
the case on the policy making side, however.
But one might push this line of thinking along a little farther... Do the
economists read what the historians write? Do the historians read what the
lit types write? Does the West Coast read the East Coast? Does the US
read Europe?
David McCann
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Re: Re: literature types on NK perspectives [message #6809 is a reply to message #6795] |
Sun, 10 August 2003 18:38 |
William Brown
Messages: 24
Registered: March 2002
|
Junior Member |
|
|
Some of the preceding makes me think that it is important for us not to over-rate the predictive value of our disciplines. The historian says policymakers are "stupid" not to recognize the historical tenaciousness of Koreans. Does he really think our leaders are such fools? Tenacious yes. Everyone knows that. That is why Pyongyang acts like, and perhaps is, the last Marxist country on earth. But does this mean North Korean socialism isn't failing just as utterly and completely as the rest? Possibly, but probably not. When we see rampant inflation, even dollarization, occurring outside the capital city, my guess is the end of the regime is near. History in other countries suggest as much as does economics and common sense. Tenacity then would simply mean a delayed but harder fall. The regime's last best hope is yet another multi-billion dollar bail out to help it eek out a few more years. Korea, of course, by any reckoning, will last another thousand years.
>From: dmccann@fas.harvard.edu (David McCann)
>Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List
>To: Korean Studies Discussion List
>Subject: Re: [KS] Re: literature types on NK perspectives
>Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2003 08:34:13 -0500
>
>
>My thanks to Morgan Clippinger for an edifying post. Points taken.
>
>Further analysis-- or not exactly analysis, the point is so obivous, if
>curious; call it an elemental sorting: on the one hand, academic types,
>CIA analysts, and others who may be said to know something about a place
>and its history, and on the other, the overly busy or otherwise preoccupied
>policymakers who don't read any of the analyses.
>
>Where does this go?
>
>It might be possible that the policy making is informed in some other way.
>It might be possible that behind or beneath the obvious provocation of the
>speech in Seoul, there might be some other line or objective of
>communication between the US and the DPRK which encouraged the DPRK to
>ignore or dismiss the -- What should one say if not 'yapping'? Maybe
>'highly insulting remarks'?-- by the White House spokesperson, and keep
>pursuing multilateral talks. (-- efforts underway to avoid Armageddon--)
>
>Assuming there is little if any transfer of information from the area
>specialist realm to the policy making realm, one might reasonably suggest
>that it doesn't matter much, in a literal or figurative sense, if some
>expert on Korea makes an error, or reaches a faulty conclusion. That isn't
>the case on the policy making side, however.
>
>But one might push this line of thinking along a little farther... Do the
>economists read what the historians write? Do the historians read what the
>lit types write? Does the West Coast read the East Coast? Does the US
>read Europe?
>
>
>David McCann
>
>
>
Tired of spam? Get advanced junk mail protection with MSN 8.
|
|
|
|
| Re: Re: literature types on NK perspectives [message #6811 is a reply to message #6809] |
Mon, 11 August 2003 07:47 |
Vladimir Tikhonov
Messages: 34
Registered: July 2000
|
Member |
|
|
The way the question "why should not the academics speak the truth louder
to the (obviously, American) policy makers and public opinion" is
formulated implies two questionable assumptions:
1. That the "policy makers" are making their decisions with benign
intentions, in a rational way conducive to the "common good", and thus may
mend their ways once persuaded in a logical way that their "policies" may
lead to some disastrous things. In a way, that is a very Weberian
assumption - that the "modern states" are governed by "rational
bureaucracies" in a common good-minded fashion. But, from more Marxian
point of view, why should we actually think that the imperial elites of our
late capitalist times - faced with resource depletion, heightened
resistance on the world "periphery", and generally diminishing returns -
are abiding by any canons of "common good" at all? Be it Russia - where the
military-industrial complex is reaping its profits from the massacres in
Chechnya which will have disastrous consequences for the Russian statehood
as a whole - or the USA (where very similarly-minded people are doing now
just the same in Iraq), the imperial elites are tending today to maximize
their own short-time returns while largely ignoring long-time fallouts. I
suspect some systemic crisis in this, but anyway - it is hard to see any
ample grounds for belief that, once "told the truth", the "masters of the
universe" will "repent and never relapse". But another thing is that the
understanding that any large-scale violence in Korea will lead to some
serious short-term losses, may by will really influence their minds?
2. That "public opinion" really means something for the ways the system
works - in other words, that we live in a "democracy". Well, I am looking
at Spanish and Polish servicemen going now to the war the majority of the
respective country's populations is opposing, and wonder what the word
"democracy" is supposed to mean? i am afraid that to make an imperial
adventure on the "periphery" a serious issue for the general populace may
require several years of protracted war and thousands - if not tens of
thousands - casualties (on "our" side, of course). By the way, the tally in
Chechnya may well approach somewhere around 10 thousands, but it still
doesn't seem to matter.
In the view that the above mentioned two assumptions are highly
questionable, I would suggest that rather "telling the truth" to South
Koreans may help much more - because what looks like an "adventure on the
periphery" from the Center, looks more like the life-and-death issue closer
to the front line. By the "truth" I mean the structural explanation of how
the imperial power is working - which may help to subvert the dominant
narrative of "benign American hegemony" among the conservative majority of
the people in their 30s and 40s.
Tikhonov
At 18:38 10.08.2003 -0400, you wrote:
>
>
>Some of the preceding makes me think that it is important for us not to
>over-rate the predictive value of our disciplines. The historian says
>policymakers are "stupid" not to recognize the historical tenaciousness of
>Koreans. Does he really think our leaders are such fools? Tenacious yes.
>Everyone knows that. That is why Pyongyang acts like, and perhaps is, the
>last Marxist country on earth. But does this mean North Korean socialism
>isn't failing just as utterly and completely as the rest? Possibly, but
>probably not. When we see rampant inflation, even dollarization, occurring
>outside the capital city, my guess is the end of the regime is
>near. History in other countries suggest as much as does economics and
>common sense. Tenacity then would simply mean a delayed but harder fall.
>The regime's last best hope is yet another multi-billion dollar bail out
>to help it eek out a few more years. Korea, of course, by any reckoning,
>will last another thousand years.
>
>
>
> >From: dmccann@fas.harvard.edu (David McCann)
> >Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List
> >To: Korean Studies Discussion List
> >Subject: Re: [KS] Re: literature types on NK perspectives
> >Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2003 08:34:13 -0500
> >
> >
> >My thanks to Morgan Clippinger for an edifying post. Points taken.
> >
> >Further analysis-- or not exactly analysis, the point is so obivous, if
> >curious; call it an elemental sorting: on the one hand, academic types,
> >CIA analysts, and others who may be said to know something about a place
> >and its history, and on the other, the overly busy or otherwise preoccupied
> >policymakers who don't read any of the analyses.
> >
> >Where does this go?
> >
> >It might be possible that the policy making is informed in some other way.
> >It might be possible that behind or beneath the obvious provocation of the
> >speech in Seoul, there might be some other line or objective of
> >communication between the US and the DPRK which encouraged the DPRK to
> >ignore or dismiss the -- What should one say if not 'yapping'? Maybe
> >'highly insulting remarks'?-- by the White House spokesperson, and keep
> >pursuing multilateral talks. (-- efforts underway to avoid Armageddon--)
> >
> >Assuming there is little if any transfer of information from the area
> >specialist realm to the policy making realm, one might reasonably suggest
> >that it doesn't matter much, in a literal or figurative sense, if some
> >expert on Korea makes an error, or reaches a faulty conclusion. That isn't
> >the case on the policy making side, however.
> >
> >But one might push this line of thinking along a little farther... Do the
> >economists read what the historians write? Do the historians read what the
> >lit types write? Does the West Coast read the East Coast? Does the US
> >read Europe?
> >
> >
> >David McCann
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>----------
>Tired of spam? Get advanced junk mail
>protection with MSN 8.
Vladimir Tikhonov,
Department of East European and Oriental Studies,
Faculty of Arts,
University of Oslo,
P.b. 1030, Blindern, 0315, Oslo, Norway.
Fax: 47-22854140; Tel: 47-22857118
Personal web page:
http://www.geocities.com/volodyatikhonov/volodyatikhonov.htm l
Electronic classrooms: East Asian/Korean Society and Politics:
http://www.geocities.com/uioeastasia2002/main.html
East Asian/Korean Religion and Philosophy:
http://www.geocities.com/uioeastasia2003/classroom.html
----------
|
|
|
|
| Re: Re: literature types on NK perspectives [message #6816 is a reply to message #6795] |
Mon, 18 August 2003 16:25 |
Balazs Szalontai
Messages: 54
Registered: September 2002
|
Member |
|
|
I doubt if the U.S. can really influence domestic developments in North
Korea. Paradoxically, a belligerence American stance can produce a
negative effect on North Korean behavior, but a flexible US policy
will not necessarily lead to a North Korean reform policy comparable
to, say, the Vietnamese doi moi. It is a habit of the KWP leadership
to appease foreign aid donors by superficial reforms (of such actions,
one may mention the economic measures taken in 1953, 1955, 1956,
1965, and so on), but they lay a very great stress on maintaining a
firm control over the North Korean population. Significantly, both
the post-1978 Chinese economic reforms and the Vietnamese doi moi
were accompanied by a certain political liberalization (not democratization!)
and a relaxation of social and cultural controls. Hardly any such "liberal"
measure has been made in the DPRK in the last decade, and if one compares
the style of "Nodong Sinmun" with that of the Vietnamese "Nhan Van,"
the differences are all too visible. The Chinese and Vietnamese party
leaders introduced the reforms of their own will, not because of external
pressure; North Korea must do the same. What the U.S. may do is to
offer P'yongyang some of the guarantees the NK ask for. Significantly,
the reforms introduced by Tito, Khrushchev, Deng, and Nguyen van Linh
were facilitated by an improvement of relations with the West. On the
other hand, the fact that Albania managed to improve her relations with
Greece, Turkey, some West European countries, and temporarily even
with Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s (for instance, Belgrade became
one of Tirana's major trading partners) did not lead to any meaningful
reforms in Albania until the regime collapsed. One may say that developments
in these countries are more independent from Great Power "advice,"
assistance, pressure, and threats than the leaders of these Great Powers
like to believe. No amount of US money could produce an economic
modernization comparable to the Taiwanese, Singaporean, and South
Korean case in, say, South Vietnam and Laos, though Laos was probably
given more American aid per capita than any other country on earth at
that time.
Balazs Szalontai
Very interesting and illuminating observations, especially re. the
installation of family members in office and the sort of instability that
may lead to-- with historical example. So instead of cutting off food and
trade, perhaps US policy makers should explore how to get more Kims into
the DPRK government, if the intended outcome is actually destabilization?
(Are there more Kims available?)
Or framed slightly differently, propose the
strategy, and use it as a check on what sorts of criteria, what areas of
information, the policy types are open to considering. Sort of a litmus
test. What is American foreign policy based on?
Alas, another question suggests itself. Is American foreign policy
vis-a-vis North Korea really just a long coded message to the PRC?
David McCann again
|
|
|
|
Goto Forum:
Current Time: Thu May 23 10:39:32 EDT 2013
|
Korean Studies Discussion List
Members
Search
Help
Register
Login
Home
