Home » Archives » KoreanStudies » assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon
| assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11066] |
Mon, 06 September 2010 07:55  |
Witteveen GP
Messages: 18
Registered: May 2009
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Junior Member |
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Musing on this Labor Day holiday in USA:
The example of calling a glass half-empty or half-full comes to mind; that is, the same agreed upon events can be seen differently then and now; differently by each party, and different to a 3rd party viewing the events from a distant, wide-angle point of view. The nomos/physis distinction I learned from classic Greece applies here: taking away all cultural context you are left with the bare facts (the explosion and direct, immediate damage): the physis of the thing. But by taking into account the storylines leading up to the event and after, as well as intentionality and concentric rings to frame the scope of significance, one comes up with diverging interpretations: the nomos of the thing. Must an event be always assessed in the vivid and urgent relativistic terms, or can an event's net result be agreed upon by (most) all parties? It seems that the initial fact, as well as the final outcomes years later are empirical questions: yes, this happened in
such a way; yes, the impact was small, medium or large. But beyond those pale judgments, there is much room for interpretations of each generation looking back, and room for interpretations of each side concerned in the matter.
As scholars sometimes trying to be dispassionate, though, we may seek a final or absolute assessment about the meaning of an event. We do this by threading together the parts of each side's perspective that seem salient to us as bystanders. But it would be dishonest to say that a scholarly synthesis can displace, trump or otherwise discredit the particular meaningfulness (or cultural "truthiness" --likeness to and resonance with a cultural truth) that is local to one side or to the other. In sum, the event and its net significance may be agreed upon, but in between those points there is a vast middle ground of multiple interpretations to account for.
--Guven Witteveen, sjmi_y@yahoo.com
middle Michigan
--- On Sun, 9/5/10, koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws wrote:
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2010 14:32:46 +0200
From: Ruediger Frank
Subject: Re: [KS] Official end of WWII in Asia
Dear all,
am I the only one who has second thoughts regarding this thread?
Let me put it this way: In today's world, would Mr. Yoon's deeds be regarded as an act of heroism? Or as an example of another -ism? Not that such a discussion would lead us very far on this list, but I find it interesting to observe how blowing up a person (or ripping off one of his legs) with a bomb can be interpreted in very different ways depending on... on what? On context? On culture? On vantage point?
Best wishes, Rudiger Frank
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11075 is a reply to message #11066] |
Tue, 07 September 2010 03:30  |
Ruediger_Frank
Messages: 90
Registered: October 2006
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Member |
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Dear all,
do we have any realistic idea about how many people in China and Korea actually learned about Mr. Yoon's act at the time? I mean, despite low urbanization, no internet/TV, few radios, wide spread analphabetism, Japanese control of most media, and lots of other noise and smoke. The 1930s wasn't quite a time of stability and tranquility in China. Was the effect confined to the elite, or had it spread to "the masses"? If so, how? And how fast? It would be fascinating to learn more about this.
Best wishes,
Rudiger Frank
on Montag, 06. September 2010 at 13:55 you wrote:
Musing on this Labor Day holiday in USA:
The example of calling a glass half-empty or half-full comes to mind; that is, the same agreed upon events can be seen differently then and now; differently by each party, and different to a 3rd party viewing the events from a distant, wide-angle point of view. The nomos/physis distinction I learned from classic Greece applies here: taking away all cultural context you are left with the bare facts (the explosion and direct, immediate damage): the physis of the thing. But by taking into account the storylines leading up to the event and after, as well as intentionality and concentric rings to frame the scope of significance, one comes up with diverging interpretations: the nomos of the thing. Must an event be always assessed in the vivid and urgent relativistic terms, or can an event's net result be agreed upon by (most) all parties? It seems that the initial fact, as well as the final outcomes years later are empirical questions: yes, this happened in such a way; yes, the impact was small, medium or large. But beyond those pale judgments, there is much room for interpretations of each generation looking back, and room for interpretations of each side concerned in the matter.
As scholars sometimes trying to be dispassionate, though, we may seek a final or absolute assessment about the meaning of an event. We do this by threading together the parts of each side's perspective that seem salient to us as bystanders. But it would be dishonest to say that a scholarly synthesis can displace, trump or otherwise discredit the particular meaningfulness (or cultural "truthiness" --likeness to and resonance with a cultural truth) that is local to one side or to the other. In sum, the event and its net significance may be agreed upon, but in between those points there is a vast middle ground of multiple interpretations to account for.
--Guven Witteveen, sjmi_y@yahoo.com
middle Michigan
--- On Sun, 9/5/10, koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws wrote:
Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2010 14:32:46 +0200
From: Ruediger Frank
Subject: Re: [KS] Official end of WWII in Asia
Dear all,
am I the only one who has second thoughts regarding this thread?
Let me put it this way: In today's world, would Mr. Yoon's deeds be regarded as an act of heroism? Or as an example of another -ism? Not that such a discussion would lead us very far on this list, but I find it interesting to observe how blowing up a person (or ripping off one of his legs) with a bomb can be interpreted in very different ways depending on... on what? On context? On culture? On vantage point?
Best wishes, Rudiger Frank
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11079 is a reply to message #11075] |
Tue, 07 September 2010 22:33 |
Frank_Hoffmann
Messages: 245
Registered: May 2013
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Senior Member
Administrator |
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>do we have any realistic idea about how many people in China and
>Korea actually learned about Mr. Yoon's act at the time?
If you read some of the reminiscences of former independence
activists (many have been published over the years in China and South
Korea) as well as various source materials of the time, you will find
that Yun Ponggil's bombing did have significant influences: for
example, Chinese Guomindang and Communist groups were now willing to
work with the Koreans and began to include Korean units in their
armies or otherwise cooperated with them. It can well be argued that
this was one of the aims of this and earlier failed such
attacks--this becomes again clear if you read through various letters
and memorials of Korean independence activists in China, talking
about the distrust of the Chinese towards them (before Yun's
bombing). Koreans were till then often seen as possible agents of the
Japanese, and in some cases that was of course also the case. If you
further follow the incidents that let up to the occupation of
Manchuria by the Japanese (that were taken as a pretext), the
so-called "Wanpaoshan Incident" (Manpozan jiken), you will then find
that the dual citizenship status of Koreans in parts of China and the
clever Japanese concept of "Divide and Rule" had given the Chinese
plenty of reasons to distrust Koreans. Korean groups in Shanghai and
Manchuria tried to overcome those obstacles in working with the
Chinese to get their support, partially by trying to *prove* that
they were worth to be supported (to then again help the Korean
cause). In this series of actions Yun's bombing was probably the most
significant one. And yes, it really did change Chinese attitudes
toward the Koreans at the time, there is no doubt about that. As for
media coverage, the bombing made it to the front pages of many major
Asian newspapers. All details were very well covered.
Again about Chinese resistance: That was not any weaker than the
Korean resistance. The point, as argued before, is rather that
Communist historians are emphasizing group activities and Communist
Party activities, not the activities of nationalist or anarchist
groups or of individuals. The Communists were early on able to create
military units to fight the Japanese. That is another reason why
desperate single-handed acts were not 'necessary' for the
Chinese--other than for the Koreans, who needed (a) to woo for
Chinese support in their cause, while (b) also proving they are no
Japanese spies, and (c) had not the military means to make a dent
into the Japanese Empire, thus were mostly limited to symbolic and
anarchist acts.
Best,
Frank
--
--------------------------------------
Frank Hoffmann
http://koreaweb.ws
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11081 is a reply to message #11079] |
Wed, 08 September 2010 05:05 |
vladimir.tikhonov
Messages: 29
Registered: January 2006
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Junior Member |
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Dear all,
It looks very unfortunate to me that one very principled and rather
balanced contemporaneous evaluation of Yun Pong'gil's act seemingly
evades the attention of the discussants here. I am thinking about Pak
HOnyOng, the then Moscow-based Korean Communist leader, who, in his July
1932 piece, "What the Shanghai Bombing Incident Means?", gave a judgment
of Yun's act which still seems to be surprisingly well-measured. He did
not see it as "violence", of course, since the actions of the Japanese
military were incomparably more violent; he even mentioned that the
"incident" was a "joyful occasion", quite understandable impression from
the viewpoint of the citizens of an occupied country. But he judged it
to be not only of little use in the course of working classes'
anti-imperialist struggle, but also directly harmful, since it was
inculcating the illusions of individual struggle in the minds of the
people, essentially putting an obstacle on the way of the more organized
class resistance. He also foresaw that Yun's act would be politically
used by the extreme right-wingers among the China-based Korean emigres
for their own self-advancement. I am afraid that there is little to add
to this analysis even now - yes, Yun's act was, of course, seen as
legitimate by the majority of politically conscious Chinese and Koreans;
but it hardly had any direct relationship to the real-life struggles of
the majority of the colonized Korean population - striking workers,
tenants on dispute, striking school pupils etc.
Vladimir/Noja
On 08.09.2010 04:33, Frank Hoffmann wrote:
>> do we have any realistic idea about how many people in China and Korea
>> actually learned about Mr. Yoon's act at the time?
>
>
> If you read some of the reminiscences of former independence activists
> (many have been published over the years in China and South Korea) as
> well as various source materials of the time, you will find that Yun
> Ponggil's bombing did have significant influences: for example, Chinese
> Guomindang and Communist groups were now willing to work with the
> Koreans and began to include Korean units in their armies or otherwise
> cooperated with them. It can well be argued that this was one of the
> aims of this and earlier failed such attacks--this becomes again clear
> if you read through various letters and memorials of Korean independence
> activists in China, talking about the distrust of the Chinese towards
> them (before Yun's bombing). Koreans were till then often seen as
> possible agents of the Japanese, and in some cases that was of course
> also the case. If you further follow the incidents that let up to the
> occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese (that were taken as a pretext),
> the so-called "Wanpaoshan Incident" (Manpozan jiken), you will then find
> that the dual citizenship status of Koreans in parts of China and the
> clever Japanese concept of "Divide and Rule" had given the Chinese
> plenty of reasons to distrust Koreans. Korean groups in Shanghai and
> Manchuria tried to overcome those obstacles in working with the Chinese
> to get their support, partially by trying to *prove* that they were
> worth to be supported (to then again help the Korean cause). In this
> series of actions Yun's bombing was probably the most significant one.
> And yes, it really did change Chinese attitudes toward the Koreans at
> the time, there is no doubt about that. As for media coverage, the
> bombing made it to the front pages of many major Asian newspapers. All
> details were very well covered.
>
> Again about Chinese resistance: That was not any weaker than the Korean
> resistance. The point, as argued before, is rather that Communist
> historians are emphasizing group activities and Communist Party
> activities, not the activities of nationalist or anarchist groups or of
> individuals. The Communists were early on able to create military units
> to fight the Japanese. That is another reason why desperate
> single-handed acts were not 'necessary' for the Chinese--other than for
> the Koreans, who needed (a) to woo for Chinese support in their cause,
> while (b) also proving they are no Japanese spies, and (c) had not the
> military means to make a dent into the Japanese Empire, thus were mostly
> limited to symbolic and anarchist acts.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Frank
>
>
--
Vladimir Tikhonov,
Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages,
Faculty of Humanities,
University of Oslo,
P.b. 1010, Blindern, 0315, Oslo, Norway.
Fax: 47-22854828; Tel: 47-22857118
Personal web page: http://folk.uio.no/vladimit/
http://www.geocities.com/volodyatikhonov/volodyatikhonov.htm l
Electronic classrooms: East Asian/Korean Society and Politics:
http://folk.uio.no/vladimit/eastasianstudies.htm
http://www.geocities.com/uioeastasia2002/main.html
East Asian/Korean Religion and Philosophy:
http://www.geocities.com/uioeastasia2003/classroom.html
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11082 is a reply to message #11081] |
Wed, 08 September 2010 10:00 |
Frank_Hoffmann
Messages: 245
Registered: May 2013
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Senior Member
Administrator |
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From how you summarize Pak Hônyông's 1932 text,
this sounds -- as expected -- like a Communist
take on the bombing incident. Again, this is the
very same interpretation you find e.g. in all the
1980s and 1990s PRC works mentioning it (or
ignoring it, for the same reason). I cannot see
anything "balanced" in this view. If thought to
the end, if you continue this line of logic, you
basically suggest that only the world revolution
will solve all problems. If you turn the burner a
step lower, then it still would have been
revolution and/or military victory over the
Japanese in Korea. I really cannot see that this
would be the measurement of history and
influences. A people also consists of not just
the "working classes" but also of a middle class,
of intellectuals, an upper class ... and the Yun
bombing did influence them in various ways, and
did influence how the Koreans in China were able
to work with the Chinese. That does not count?
And does it not count that -- as Jim Thomas
pointed out -- that many Chinese scholars even
today have that incident in the back of their
mind when talking about Korean resistance during
that period. However you evaluate or name such
attacks (patriotic or terrorist brutality),
influences are not just measured in terms of
world revolution and freeing "working classes," I
think.
Best,
Frank
>Dear all,
>
>It looks very unfortunate to me that one very
>principled and rather balanced contemporaneous
>evaluation of Yun Pong'gil's act seemingly
>evades the attention of the discussants here. I
>am thinking about Pak HOnyOng, the then
>Moscow-based Korean Communist leader, who, in
>his July 1932 piece, "What the Shanghai Bombing
>Incident Means?", gave a judgment of Yun's act
>which still seems to be surprisingly
>well-measured. He did not see it as "violence",
>of course, since the actions of the Japanese
>military were incomparably more violent; he even
>mentioned that the "incident" was a "joyful
>occasion", quite understandable impression from
>the viewpoint of the citizens of an occupied
>country. But he judged it to be not only of
>little use in the course of working classes'
>anti-imperialist struggle, but also directly
>harmful, since it was inculcating the illusions
>of individual struggle in the minds of the
>people, essentially putting an obstacle on the
>way of the more organized class resistance. He
>also foresaw that Yun's act would be politically
>used by the extreme right-wingers among the
>China-based Korean emigres for their own
>self-advancement. I am afraid that there is
>little to add to this analysis even now - yes,
>Yun's act was, of course, seen as legitimate by
>the majority of politically conscious Chinese
>and Koreans; but it hardly had any direct
>relationship to the real-life struggles of the
>majority of the colonized Korean population -
>striking workers, tenants on dispute, striking
>school pupils etc.
>
>Vladimir/Noja
--
--------------------------------------
Frank Hoffmann
http://koreaweb.ws
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11083 is a reply to message #11082] |
Wed, 08 September 2010 16:46 |
vladimir.tikhonov
Messages: 29
Registered: January 2006
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Junior Member |
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Dear Frank (and others),
I am afraid that there was some misunderstanding involved here. While it
is completely true that Pak Hônyông's approach generally followed
Comintern's logic - quite expectedly, I would say, - I do not think that
either Pak or his comrades in colonized Korea were simply obsessed with
"world revolution" to the point of ignoring everything else. In fact, from
what I read, it looks that in the 1930s the Korean Communists wisely
shifted there efforts from "party building" to the organizational work on
the factories, at the peasant associations, and even among the students
and college teachers (including even Keijo Imperial University) - and
gained good results, leading some important and influential struggles. You
can look, for example, at 1931 solidarity strike at 26 rice mills in
Taegu, or 1934 HamhUng steelmill strike etc. Solidarity strikes were quite
rare until the late 1920s, but became quite common during the peak of the
workers' striking activity in the early 1930s, in the wake of the Great
Depression. Communists and other leftists who were in many cases leading
the strikes in the 1930s, paid grave price for this - only in 1930-35,
1,795 people were arrested in Korea in connection with the revolutionary
workers' movement, and more than 70 "red" unions destroyed by the police.
For all these people, who were basically fighting for their wages, for the
reinstatement of the fired comrades, for their human dignity as workers
etc. - and for the "world revolution", but on much more abstract level -
the "heroic deeds" of the middle-class nationalist radicals like Yun were
something very remote and indeed foreign. Workers and peasants were in
most cases in no position to use violence - that meant to give an
immediate pretext for violent suppression. And Pak Hônyông, the person who
could legitimately claim to represent their interests, was explaining to
his public that the "heroic deeds" of this type were also dangerous,
since, once appropriated by the right-wingers, they would strengthen the
positions of the radical nationalist Right - the people of Kim Ku's type.
I am afraid that he was somewhat prophetic in saying so. And in today's
South Korea, everybody is expected to know Yun Pong'gil, while much more
inclusive and were meaningful struggles (mainly strikes) led by the people
like Yi Chaeyu in KyOngsOng or Yi Chuha in WOnsan, are known to a handful
of specialists at best. Politics of collective memory, so to say...
Best,
Vladimir/Noja
> From how you summarize Pak Hônyông's 1932 text,
> this sounds -- as expected -- like a Communist
> take on the bombing incident. Again, this is the
> very same interpretation you find e.g. in all the
> 1980s and 1990s PRC works mentioning it (or
> ignoring it, for the same reason). I cannot see
> anything "balanced" in this view. If thought to
> the end, if you continue this line of logic, you
> basically suggest that only the world revolution
> will solve all problems. If you turn the burner a
> step lower, then it still would have been
> revolution and/or military victory over the
> Japanese in Korea. I really cannot see that this
> would be the measurement of history and
> influences. A people also consists of not just
> the "working classes" but also of a middle class,
> of intellectuals, an upper class ... and the Yun
> bombing did influence them in various ways, and
> did influence how the Koreans in China were able
> to work with the Chinese. That does not count?
> And does it not count that -- as Jim Thomas
> pointed out -- that many Chinese scholars even
> today have that incident in the back of their
> mind when talking about Korean resistance during
> that period. However you evaluate or name such
> attacks (patriotic or terrorist brutality),
> influences are not just measured in terms of
> world revolution and freeing "working classes," I
> think.
>
>
> Best,
> Frank
>
>
>>Dear all,
>>
>>It looks very unfortunate to me that one very
>>principled and rather balanced contemporaneous
>>evaluation of Yun Pong'gil's act seemingly
>>evades the attention of the discussants here. I
>>am thinking about Pak HOnyOng, the then
>>Moscow-based Korean Communist leader, who, in
>>his July 1932 piece, "What the Shanghai Bombing
>>Incident Means?", gave a judgment of Yun's act
>>which still seems to be surprisingly
>>well-measured. He did not see it as "violence",
>>of course, since the actions of the Japanese
>>military were incomparably more violent; he even
>>mentioned that the "incident" was a "joyful
>>occasion", quite understandable impression from
>>the viewpoint of the citizens of an occupied
>>country. But he judged it to be not only of
>>little use in the course of working classes'
>>anti-imperialist struggle, but also directly
>>harmful, since it was inculcating the illusions
>>of individual struggle in the minds of the
>>people, essentially putting an obstacle on the
>>way of the more organized class resistance. He
>>also foresaw that Yun's act would be politically
>>used by the extreme right-wingers among the
>>China-based Korean emigres for their own
>>self-advancement. I am afraid that there is
>>little to add to this analysis even now - yes,
>>Yun's act was, of course, seen as legitimate by
>>the majority of politically conscious Chinese
>>and Koreans; but it hardly had any direct
>>relationship to the real-life struggles of the
>>majority of the colonized Korean population -
>>striking workers, tenants on dispute, striking
>>school pupils etc.
>>
>>Vladimir/Noja
>
> --
> --------------------------------------
> Frank Hoffmann
> http://koreaweb.ws
>
>
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11084 is a reply to message #11083] |
Wed, 08 September 2010 19:08 |
Frank_Hoffmann
Messages: 245
Registered: May 2013
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Senior Member
Administrator |
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Dear Vladimir:
Interesting read -- thanks!
Okay, but where is the misunderstanding? Can you
try to nail it down further, if you have the time?
The response was only about (a) the Pak Hônyông
text--as you summarized it, and (b) your own
historical evaluation of that text
("well-measured" and "there is little to add to
[Pak's] analysis"). It was not a response about
Pak's wider activities or the Communists'
maneuvering and tactics in Korea. To clarify
further from my end, I wanted to point out that
anti-colonial activities of people that are
counted into the nationalist (or radical
nationalist) camp were also of great importance,
had also influences, even though many of their
acts had more symbolic importance than say the
organization of labor strikes within Korea, short
and long term influences. In your posting you
quoted (or summarized) Pak Hônyông's text without
distancing yourself from it, basically
subscribing to its logic of >>only activities
that involve the colonial masses and that aim at
enhancing their life conditions are worth
historic attention<< (or something in that line
of thought). I would like to question that this
(unrevised-old-style-Leftist) approach can be
sustained. It could not even sustained in the
1930s--could it?
>> And Pak Hônyông, the person who could legitimately claim to
>> represent their interests (...)
Well, again, that's one of the points, yes? Could
he claim "legitimately" to represent anyone
outside the Korean Communist Party? Was he
elected by the workers (or even workers and
peasants)?
>> only in 1930-35 1,795 people were arrested in Korea in connection
>> with the revolutionary workers' movement (...)
Everything is relative, especially statistics.
For example, at the lengthy Minneapolis
Teamsters' Strike ('Local 574') in 1934 alone,
under Trotskyist leadership, 30 to 40,000 people
marched for workers' rights (about half of them
were workers). I didn't look it up, but likely
there were more arrests done at that one strike
than during the entire colonial period in Korea,
as far as union related arrests go -- and this
was in just one American city. And in
Berlin/Germany the same would be true for many
early 1930s strikes and demonstrations, not to
talk about the many almost clubbed to death by
Weimar police. Statistics always only make sense
in a wider context. What is the context here? The
industrialization of Korea really only gathered
speed in the late 1930s. In the 1920s the
proletariat was small (you mention that there
were no solidarity strikes until the late 1920s
-- well, also because there were not that many
workers). Then again, it might be useful to
compare those strikes to strikes in Japan, where
of course the labor movement and the leftist
movement was far more active and organized than
it ever was in Korea. If I now take the fact into
account that Korea was during most of the
colonial period NOT a fully industrialized
country with an overwhelmingly large proletariat
(what was the percentage of industrial workers by
1945?), but rather a still rural society with
still traditional feudal structures, etc., then
maybe those nationalist "right-wing" acts of the
Kim Ku type were after all not that meaningless
for Koreans--at the minimum creating "heroes" to
look up to.
Best,
Frank
--
--------------------------------------
Frank Hoffmann
http://koreaweb.ws
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11086 is a reply to message #11084] |
Thu, 09 September 2010 16:31 |
vladimir.tikhonov
Messages: 29
Registered: January 2006
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Junior Member |
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Dear Frank (and all others),
sorry - it looks as if I did not manage to make it clear what I meant by
"misunderstanding". I did not intend to state that Yun's act was of no
consequence. It certainly was - for Kim Ku group's relations with its
senior partners from Guomindang (and some more sinister organizations,
like the unfamous Blue Shirts Society), for Kim Ku's authority among the
China-based Korean nationalist and (partly) anarchist militants, for the
general "encouragement" of the nationalist spirit among the middle-class
public inside Korea etc. There is no doubt that all this is important for
history. What I am afraid, however, is that we will allow the people who
planned Yun's act, and then politically and propagandistically used it -
mostly middle-class nationalist public - speak for the "(Korean) people"
as a whole. Yes, there were certainly Koreans for whom Yun was (and is) a
hero - and there were (and there are) Koreans who saw it as rather a
distraction from the serious struggle for both social and national
liberation. The difference between the two groups is that the first one,
in the end, effectively silenced the second - at least, until the late
1980s. After 1945, the semi-cultic attitude toward Yun was promoted and
encouraged both by the nationalists who grouped around Kim Ku, by
Chokch'Ong ideologues (semi-fascist followers of Yi POmsOk), and also by
Tong'a Ilbo and Korean Democratic Party, who needed some national heroes
for public consumption, since they themselves, given the amount of sake
they regularly drank at Sotokofu parties, simply did not fir into this
role. So venerable Tonga came very soon editorializing on the
world-historical and universal ethical significance of Yun's "righteous
exploit" (April 30, 1946) - just as a general witchhunt against the
Southern Communists, all their past efforts in the underground resistance
notwithstanding, was being prepared.
Just to summarise - I do not doubt the historical significance of Yun's
action, but I am very afraid of oversizing it - and falling into the trap
of the right-wing nationalist/official South Korean propaganda. After all,
Kim Ilsung's Poch'Onbo raid also had some historical significance (was
reported by Tonga Ilbo and served to "lift up the spirits", so to say) -
which doesn't mean that you have to take seriously the North Korean
descriptions of it as an epic battle. And I certainly do not identify
myself fully with Pak HOnyOng and his opinions (conditioned as they were
by the circumstances of time and place - Moscow, 1932, was not a
particularly good place for free and independent thinkers), but I have no
doubt that he authentically attempted to articulate the interests of
Korea's downtrodden as best as he could.
Best,
Vladimir/Noja
> Dear Vladimir:
>
> Interesting read -- thanks!
> Okay, but where is the misunderstanding? Can you
> try to nail it down further, if you have the time?
> The response was only about (a) the Pak Hônyông
> text--as you summarized it, and (b) your own
> historical evaluation of that text
> ("well-measured" and "there is little to add to
> [Pak's] analysis"). It was not a response about
> Pak's wider activities or the Communists'
> maneuvering and tactics in Korea. To clarify
> further from my end, I wanted to point out that
> anti-colonial activities of people that are
> counted into the nationalist (or radical
> nationalist) camp were also of great importance,
> had also influences, even though many of their
> acts had more symbolic importance than say the
> organization of labor strikes within Korea, short
> and long term influences. In your posting you
> quoted (or summarized) Pak Hônyông's text without
> distancing yourself from it, basically
> subscribing to its logic of >>only activities
> that involve the colonial masses and that aim at
> enhancing their life conditions are worth
> historic attention<< (or something in that line
> of thought). I would like to question that this
> (unrevised-old-style-Leftist) approach can be
> sustained. It could not even sustained in the
> 1930s--could it?
>
>>> And Pak Hônyông, the person who could legitimately claim to
>>> represent their interests (...)
>
> Well, again, that's one of the points, yes? Could
> he claim "legitimately" to represent anyone
> outside the Korean Communist Party? Was he
> elected by the workers (or even workers and
> peasants)?
>
>>> only in 1930-35 1,795 people were arrested in Korea in connection
>>> with the revolutionary workers' movement (...)
>
> Everything is relative, especially statistics.
> For example, at the lengthy Minneapolis
> Teamsters' Strike ('Local 574') in 1934 alone,
> under Trotskyist leadership, 30 to 40,000 people
> marched for workers' rights (about half of them
> were workers). I didn't look it up, but likely
> there were more arrests done at that one strike
> than during the entire colonial period in Korea,
> as far as union related arrests go -- and this
> was in just one American city. And in
> Berlin/Germany the same would be true for many
> early 1930s strikes and demonstrations, not to
> talk about the many almost clubbed to death by
> Weimar police. Statistics always only make sense
> in a wider context. What is the context here? The
> industrialization of Korea really only gathered
> speed in the late 1930s. In the 1920s the
> proletariat was small (you mention that there
> were no solidarity strikes until the late 1920s
> -- well, also because there were not that many
> workers). Then again, it might be useful to
> compare those strikes to strikes in Japan, where
> of course the labor movement and the leftist
> movement was far more active and organized than
> it ever was in Korea. If I now take the fact into
> account that Korea was during most of the
> colonial period NOT a fully industrialized
> country with an overwhelmingly large proletariat
> (what was the percentage of industrial workers by
> 1945?), but rather a still rural society with
> still traditional feudal structures, etc., then
> maybe those nationalist "right-wing" acts of the
> Kim Ku type were after all not that meaningless
> for Koreans--at the minimum creating "heroes" to
> look up to.
>
>
> Best,
> Frank
>
>
> --
> --------------------------------------
> Frank Hoffmann
> http://koreaweb.ws
>
>
|
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| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11087 is a reply to message #11086] |
Fri, 10 September 2010 16:05 |
Frank_Hoffmann
Messages: 245
Registered: May 2013
|
Senior Member
Administrator |
|
|
Thank you Vladimir. Again a very interesting
read. What you explain now makes sense to me. I
just like to add this:
What is highly fascinating is that many of the
leftist activists (from colonial Korea and China)
were active well into the 1960s--turned down
somewhat, and oftentimes 45 degrees turned in
direction (e.g. as Social Democrats). But when
first looking at the political history of the ROK
after liberation to the 1960s I was quite amazed
to see this. It was unexpected to find all the
same names re-appearing again and again,
reshuffling their resources over and over and
building one new party after another. They all
only disappeared in the later 1960s, in most
cases for natural reasons, having become aged or
passing away, parallel to Pak Chung Hee's
tightening of the grip, it seems.
Many historians will probably agree with your
analysis and evaluation (in your last response)
of post-liberation South Korean creations of
heroic figures and all the overtones. What I
still question though is the role and judgement
of Communist leaders like Pak Hônyông: as you
mentioned, Moscow in 1932 was not exactly a place
for free and independent thinkers. That's put
very mildly! When you look through the published
memories or diaries or letters (of people like Yu
Rim and other leftist activists) you will find
that many engaged young Koreans who would
otherwise very likely have followed the Communist
cause were completely turned off by reading about
the circumstances of Stalin's takeover in 1924,
and other Bolshevik suppression strategies even
before that. Now, you can separate the Korean
Communists from Moscow--but then, you obviously
cannot when quoting Pak Hônyông who physically
sits in Moscow while making such a statement.
What I mean is that there were quite a number of
young engaged Koreans out there who, already in
the 1920s, saw the signs of the time, the signs
for an extremely brutal dictatorship--Stalin and
his Party murdering or putting into the Gulag 18
million people, as we know by today. Why would
the views of someone who just received the
blessings by such a brutal dictator in Moscow be
considered to have "well-measured" views of the
situation, where even today "there is little to
add to"? THAT is what I had some problems
with--in your first response. That seems
romaticizing the early Communist movement and
their leaders. While what you pointed out in your
last response about the construction of South
Korean heroic figures makes perfect sense,
establishing someone like Pak Hônyông and his
1932 views as a moral counterpart to that has a
taste of the grotesque to it, also if you
consider how the North of the country looks today.
Best wishes,
Frank
--
--------------------------------------
Frank Hoffmann
http://koreaweb.ws
|
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|
| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11095 is a reply to message #11087] |
Wed, 15 September 2010 03:20 |
vladimir.tikhonov
Messages: 29
Registered: January 2006
|
Junior Member |
|
|
Dear Frank, thank you very much for the detailed explanations on your
views. Now it looks as if we mostly agree with each other: that Stalinism
did cause enormous damage to the radical movements in colonial Korea (and
elsewhere) is irrefutable truth, and that Pak Hônyông, very unfortunately,
was just too disciplined a Communist to doubt the Comintern or Stalin's
line, is what most people who research on him (Yun Haedong, An ChaesOng,
Im KyOngsOk and others) say too. It is not, of course, that every
colonial-time Communist was a doubt-free Moscow follower - for one good
example, Kim Ch'Olsu, a Waseda graduate, Pak's rival in the fraction
struggles of the 1920s and long-term prisoner in the colonial prisons in
the 1930s, was in favour of much softer position on the issues of legal
vs. illegal work or collaboration with the colonial bourgeois-nationalist
mainstream than Comintern or Pak. Then, you have the people like Cho
Pongam - whose long-felt discontent about Stalin and Stalinism moved him
in the end, in 1946-47, from Communist onto the Social Democratic
positions. What his subsequent fate shows, however, was that in the realm
of Syngman Rhee's white terror, no "democratic socialism" talks would save
your life if you were deeemed really dangerous to the powers to be.
There is, however, one principal point on which I will it difficult to
agree with your position. It is the question of the relationship between
the world-historical phenomena and their local - that is, Korean, -
incarnation. I would view this relationship as rather dialectic (in the
Marxist sense of the word) than simply mechanical - that is, would rather
pay more attention to the quantitative (and resulting qualitative) changes
these phenomena undergo in the Korean context. After all, as even
postcolonial studies tell us, all things are being negotiated, and the
"locals" are not simply recipients of global teachings or trends - they
have the agency of their own. You, for example, probably agree with the
statement that Christianity, while hardly seen as a progressive force in
late 19th C. Europe or USA, did play a certain progressive role in
pre-colonial or early colonial Korea - by promoting female education, for
example. Then, why should we overlook the possibility of the independent
agency in the Korean Communists' case as well? After all, there
programme-minimum including mostly the points on which their potential
electorate would enthusiastically agree (radical land reform, 8 hours
working days etc.), regardless of any Comintern or Stalins' wishes.
Absolute majority of Communist-led strikes were fought on local, concrete
demands, first and foremost. And Pak Hônyông's dim view of nationalist
diehards and the ideological dangers their bomb-throwing tactics might
imply - could not it be as much a product of his own experience in dealing
with this sort of public as it was an outcome of Moscow-produced theories?
Best wishes,
Vladimir/Noja
> Thank you Vladimir. Again a very interesting
> read. What you explain now makes sense to me. I
> just like to add this:
>
> What is highly fascinating is that many of the
> leftist activists (from colonial Korea and China)
> were active well into the 1960s--turned down
> somewhat, and oftentimes 45 degrees turned in
> direction (e.g. as Social Democrats). But when
> first looking at the political history of the ROK
> after liberation to the 1960s I was quite amazed
> to see this. It was unexpected to find all the
> same names re-appearing again and again,
> reshuffling their resources over and over and
> building one new party after another. They all
> only disappeared in the later 1960s, in most
> cases for natural reasons, having become aged or
> passing away, parallel to Pak Chung Hee's
> tightening of the grip, it seems.
>
> Many historians will probably agree with your
> analysis and evaluation (in your last response)
> of post-liberation South Korean creations of
> heroic figures and all the overtones. What I
> still question though is the role and judgement
> of Communist leaders like Pak Hônyông: as you
> mentioned, Moscow in 1932 was not exactly a place
> for free and independent thinkers. That's put
> very mildly! When you look through the published
> memories or diaries or letters (of people like Yu
> Rim and other leftist activists) you will find
> that many engaged young Koreans who would
> otherwise very likely have followed the Communist
> cause were completely turned off by reading about
> the circumstances of Stalin's takeover in 1924,
> and other Bolshevik suppression strategies even
> before that. Now, you can separate the Korean
> Communists from Moscow--but then, you obviously
> cannot when quoting Pak Hônyông who physically
> sits in Moscow while making such a statement.
> What I mean is that there were quite a number of
> young engaged Koreans out there who, already in
> the 1920s, saw the signs of the time, the signs
> for an extremely brutal dictatorship--Stalin and
> his Party murdering or putting into the Gulag 18
> million people, as we know by today. Why would
> the views of someone who just received the
> blessings by such a brutal dictator in Moscow be
> considered to have "well-measured" views of the
> situation, where even today "there is little to
> add to"? THAT is what I had some problems
> with--in your first response. That seems
> romaticizing the early Communist movement and
> their leaders. While what you pointed out in your
> last response about the construction of South
> Korean heroic figures makes perfect sense,
> establishing someone like Pak Hônyông and his
> 1932 views as a moral counterpart to that has a
> taste of the grotesque to it, also if you
> consider how the North of the country looks today.
>
>
> Best wishes,
> Frank
>
>
> --
> --------------------------------------
> Frank Hoffmann
> http://koreaweb.ws
>
>
|
|
|
|
| Re: assessing historical meanings - Mr. Yoon [message #11099 is a reply to message #11095] |
Wed, 15 September 2010 18:11 |
Frank_Hoffmann
Messages: 245
Registered: May 2013
|
Senior Member
Administrator |
|
|
Dear Vladimir:
Yes, sure -- but below you are clarifying
something that was not stated otherwise. Korean
communists have indeed succeeded to create their
very own little "purges" and "work camps" --
quite independent from Moscow, totally localized
ones. (Irony intended.) And they started to work
on this early on, already during the colonial
period in Manchuria. ...Wasn't Helen Foster
Snow's (Nym Wales) romanticizing book on Kim San
(Chang Chirak) just mentioned here two weeks ago?
It has the sub-title A Korean Communist in the
Chinese Revolution. And what happened to Kim San,
and why so?
In any case, what you say below is certainly not wrong.
Best,
Frank
>There is, however, one principal point on which I will it difficult to
>agree with your position. It is the question of the relationship between
>the world-historical phenomena and their local - that is, Korean, -
>incarnation. I would view this relationship as rather dialectic (in the
>Marxist sense of the word) than simply mechanical - that is, would rather
>pay more attention to the quantitative (and resulting qualitative) changes
>these phenomena undergo in the Korean context. After all, as even
>postcolonial studies tell us, all things are being negotiated, and the
>"locals" are not simply recipients of global teachings or trends - they
>have the agency of their own. You, for example, probably agree with the
>statement that Christianity, while hardly seen as a progressive force in
>late 19th C. Europe or USA, did play a certain progressive role in
>pre-colonial or early colonial Korea - by promoting female education, for
>example. Then, why should we overlook the possibility of the independent
>agency in the Korean Communists' case as well? After all, there
>programme-minimum including mostly the points on which their potential
>electorate would enthusiastically agree (radical land reform, 8 hours
>working days etc.), regardless of any Comintern or Stalins' wishes.
>Absolute majority of Communist-led strikes were fought on local, concrete
>demands, first and foremost. And Pak Hônyông's dim view of nationalist
>diehards and the ideological dangers their bomb-throwing tactics might
>imply - could not it be as much a product of his own experience in dealing
>with this sort of public as it was an outcome of Moscow-produced theories?
>
>Best wishes,
>
>Vladimir/Noja
--
--------------------------------------
Frank Hoffmann
http://koreaweb.ws
|
|
|
|
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